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    <title>NHTSA on Liam Ding</title>
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      <title>Waymo&#39;s school bus recall patched a reason, not a rule</title>
      <link>https://www.liamding.com/en/posts/2026-11-16-waymo-school-bus-recall-patched-a-reason-not-a-rule/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0800</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.liamding.com/en/posts/2026-11-16-waymo-school-bus-recall-patched-a-reason-not-a-rule/</guid>
      <description>NHTSA says most of the incidents it identified came after the software fix. The recall removed one bad reason to move; the law lists the only three things that may end the hold.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 id="the-problem">The problem</h2>
<p>On 6 November 2026, NHTSA&rsquo;s Office of Defects Investigation opened a recall query, RQ26006, into Waymo&rsquo;s fifth-generation driving system. The record is short and pointed. Waymo filed recall 25E084 in December 2025 so that its cars would stay stopped for school buses with red lights flashing or the stop arm out. The software remedy, the recall report said, was on every affected vehicle by 17 November 2025. Yet &ldquo;of the total reported incidents identified during PE25013, a majority of the incidents occurred after the November 17, 2025 remedy date.&rdquo; ODI now wants to assess whether the remedy was adequate and to find the causes of the post-remedy reports. NHTSA lists a population of 2,895 on both the RQ26006 resume and the PE25013 closing resume (Reuters reports the same figure, as 2,895 vehicles). Recall 25E084 lists 3,067 software units.</p>
<p>The same day, on northbound I-280 in San Francisco, a driverless Waymo tried to get around a California Highway Patrol traffic break, the rolling slowdown officers use to hold traffic while debris is cleared. According to officers quoted by ABC7, it tried to pass the patrol cars twice before they steered into its path. CHP told NBC Bay Area the car &ldquo;ultimately complied and stayed back with traffic,&rdquo; and that it has had no communication with Waymo about the incident. NBC also reported that Waymo had not responded to requests for comment on this video, but has previously said it works with first responders to improve how its vehicles respond to traffic hazards, and that it has remote assistance and emergency response teams that can respond rapidly.</p>
<p>Two unrelated scenes, one shared question: when an authority tells traffic to hold, what is allowed to end the hold for a robotaxi?</p>
<h2 id="what-i-concluded">What I concluded</h2>
<p>The recall fixed a reason. The rule needed an allowlist.</p>
<p>Waymo&rsquo;s own Part 573 report is unusually candid about the original defect. The car was designed to avoid impeding priority vehicles such as buses. An August 2025 release changed how the system predicted other road users&rsquo; intentions, and after that, while yielding to a school bus, the system sometimes decided it might be impeding the bus or another priority vehicle &ldquo;and then reasoned that it should proceed in order to cease impeding the other vehicle.&rdquo; The remedy removed that specific reason: the system no longer prioritizes &ldquo;moving to avoid impeding vehicles over appropriately remaining stationary.&rdquo; The described remedy targets that one reason; the release also carried other, undescribed school-bus enhancements.</p>
<p>That is a blocklist: the remedy text names one bad reason to move and forbids it. But Texas law, which governs the Austin incidents, is written the other way round. A driver who stops for a school bus &ldquo;may not proceed until&rdquo; one of three things happens: the bus resumes motion, the bus driver signals to proceed, or the visual signal is no longer on. Every one of those release conditions is owned by the bus. Those three apply where the driver must stop. Section 545.066(b) exempts an operator on a highway with separate roadways from stopping for a bus on a different roadway, and, on a controlled-access highway, for a bus stopped in a loading zone where pedestrians are not permitted to cross. Under (f)(2), a highway separated only by a left-turn lane is not a separate-roadway case. The 12 January stop was on East Oltorf, which the NTSB describes as undivided, with an eastbound left-turn lane, so (f)(2) applies and the duty to stop did too. None of the release conditions is the car&rsquo;s own inference, the behaviour of other traffic, or an answer from someone who is not there.</p>
<p>The NTSB&rsquo;s preliminary account of 12 January 2026, eight weeks after the remedy date, shows why the difference matters. An unoccupied Waymo in Austin was the first vehicle to stop for a school bus with strobing red lights and two stop arms extended. Three cars passed the bus anyway. The Waymo asked remote assistance, &ldquo;is this a school bus with active signals?&rdquo; After a fourth car passed, an agent in Novi, Michigan answered &ldquo;No.&rdquo; The Waymo resumed and passed the bus with its stop arms still out. The NTSB has not determined probable cause, and I am not claiming this one event explains NHTSA&rsquo;s count. What the remedy text does not mention is the sequence: the car resumed right after the agent answered &ldquo;No.&rdquo;</p>
<p>So my conclusion: an authority hold, whether a school bus stop arm or a CHP traffic break, should be specified as a short list of conditions that may release it, and everything else, including the planner&rsquo;s judgement and a single remote answer, should be unable to. Fixing the reasons one at a time will keep finding new reasons.</p>
<h2 id="constraints">Constraints</h2>
<p>The first constraint is the product&rsquo;s own politeness. Waymo designed the car not to impede buses and other priority vehicles, and that is a good instinct in most traffic. The recall shows the cost: the same &ldquo;don&rsquo;t be in the way&rdquo; logic, combined with a new prediction method, turned into a reason to leave. Any hard hold has to override that instinct without deleting it everywhere else.</p>
<p>The second constraint is that other drivers break the rule. In the January case, five human drivers passed the bus too. A system that learns from or reacts to surrounding traffic will see a lane full of cars going, and a remote agent looking at the same feed may read it the same way. Crowd behaviour is evidence of what people do, not of what the bus is signalling.</p>
<p>The third constraint is the remote-assistance loop. The NTSB describes remote assistance as information or advice to a driverless car from someone elsewhere. That loop exists for good reasons: a parked bus with hazard lights, a broken signal, an ambiguous scene. But it means the honest scope of a &ldquo;software&rdquo; remedy includes the question the car asks, the answer options the agent has, and what the car does with each answer.</p>
<p>The fourth constraint is how &ldquo;fixed&rdquo; is measured. Recall 25E084&rsquo;s schedule says the remedy was already on every vehicle, which Waymo owns, so no owner notices were needed. That makes installation trivially complete. It says nothing about behaviour. Waymo told TechCrunch, &ldquo;We have made significant improvements to vehicle behavior around school buses and have received no citations since March 2026.&rdquo; That is a better kind of number, but citations depend on enforcement, and the Part 573 report itself counted 12 citations between late September and mid-November 2025, while the first known event, on 22 September, was found through Waymo&rsquo;s own field monitoring and drew no citation.</p>
<h2 id="the-options-and-what-i-traded-away">The options, and what I traded away</h2>
<p>This is my reconstruction of the option set, not Waymo&rsquo;s internal reasoning.</p>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Option</th>
          <th>What it buys</th>
          <th>What it costs</th>
          <th>Verdict</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td>Patch the specific reason (the 25E084 remedy)</td>
          <td>Fast, targeted, low risk of side effects</td>
          <td>Other release paths stay open; the next reason is found in the field</td>
          <td>Necessary, not sufficient</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Let remote assistance decide ambiguous holds</td>
          <td>Handles broken lights and odd scenes</td>
          <td>The car can resume after a single remote answer; the agent sees what the car sees</td>
          <td>The path in the 12 January sequence</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Avoid school routes at bus times</td>
          <td>Fewer encounters</td>
          <td>Buses are everywhere; service gaps; does nothing for police holds</td>
          <td>Not a spec</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Allowlist the release conditions in law, hard hold otherwise</td>
          <td>Matches the statute; easy to test and audit</td>
          <td>Cars will sometimes sit behind a bus with stuck lights and block traffic</td>
          <td>What I would do</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Allowlist plus asymmetric remote assistance</td>
          <td>Remote answers can keep the car stopped freely; releasing needs evidence of a listed condition</td>
          <td>Slower clearance; more remote staffing</td>
          <td>What I would do, together</td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<p>The trade I am accepting is more stuck cars. A robotaxi that will not move until the bus moves, the bus driver waves, or the lights go off will occasionally wait behind a bus whose lights are faulty, and someone will film that too. I prefer that failure. Being stuck behind a bus is an operations problem; passing a stop arm is a child-safety problem, and in Texas a first offence carries a $500 to $1,250 fine for a human driver.</p>
<h2 id="evidence">Evidence</h2>
<p>The strongest evidence is in NHTSA&rsquo;s and Waymo&rsquo;s own documents, and they agree with each other. The Part 573 report describes a defect in the decision to leave, not in seeing the bus: the car was &ldquo;stopped or stopping&rdquo; and then reasoned its way into proceeding. The remedy text targets that reasoning; the same release also carried other, undescribed school-bus enhancements. NHTSA&rsquo;s recall query says most incidents it identified came after the remedy date. Put together, the remedy text addressed the reason Waymo wrote down first, and the regulator is now asking about the rest.</p>
<p>The NTSB account adds one concrete post-remedy sequence, and it is not the sequence in the recall text. The car was the first to stop, then asked remote assistance to confirm. It resumed right after the agent answered &ldquo;No.&rdquo; The NTSB has not determined the cause. NTSB footnotes that the bus carried stop-arm cameras, which is also the clearest external data source anyone has for measuring this behaviour.</p>
<p>The scale figures need care. NHTSA&rsquo;s public tally lists 27 outside-source incidents on the PE25013 closing resume, described as the 22 September 2025 Atlanta media report plus Austin ISD traffic citations, and 8 Austin ISD citations on the RQ opening. In both resumes Waymo&rsquo;s own count and the total are marked confidential, so the full total and the exact post-remedy count are not public; NHTSA says only that a majority came after 17 November 2025. Reuters, via Khaleej Times, reports 19 violations documented by Austin ISD and six in Atlanta; TechCrunch says Austin ISD reported at least five incidents at the time of its letter. The CHP incident comes from news reports and an officer&rsquo;s account. Waymo had not commented on that video; NBC also reported that Waymo has previously said it works with first responders and has remote assistance and emergency response teams. I am treating it as a second example of an authority hold, not as part of NHTSA&rsquo;s case.</p>
<h2 id="where-this-stops-being-true">Where this stops being true</h2>
<p>Cause: if RQ26006 finds the post-remedy reports were mostly perception misses, cars that never recognised the bus or the stop arm in the first place, an allowlist does not help, because the hold never starts. Then the fix is detection, and my argument is about the wrong layer. Timing: Waymo says it has had no citations since March 2026. If NHTSA&rsquo;s post-remedy incidents cluster between November 2025 and March 2026 and stop after later releases, the &ldquo;other enhancements&rdquo; may already have closed the gap, and the query is mostly about whether the original recall was adequate on paper. Cost: if faulty school bus lights turn out to be common, a hard hold will strand cars often enough to cause its own traffic hazards, and the remote release path will need to be faster than I am assuming. Police holds: a CHP traffic break is a moving hold with no stop arm or statute-defined signal, so the allowlist there is harder to write, probably &ldquo;stay behind the last patrol car until it clears,&rdquo; and it needs input from the officers who run them.</p>
<h2 id="what-i-would-do-differently">What I would do differently</h2>
<p>Write the remedy as a behaviour spec, not a bug fix. For school buses: stop for an active signal, and release only on the statute&rsquo;s three conditions. Test against that list and publish it, the way the recall already publishes the defect.</p>
<p>Make remote assistance asymmetric. An agent should be able to keep a car stopped with one click. Releasing a car from a school bus hold should require evidence of a listed condition, such as the lights going off on the car&rsquo;s own sensors, or a second reviewer, and the prompt should never be a bare yes-or-no question asked while other cars are passing.</p>
<p>Define &ldquo;remedy complete&rdquo; as a field rate, not an install date. Count school bus encounters and stop-arm passes per encounter for a set period after release, and check the count against data the operator does not control, such as district stop-arm cameras. &ldquo;Deployed to all vehicles on 17 November&rdquo; should be the start of the measurement, not the end of the recall.</p>
<p>Treat police traffic breaks as the same class. CHP says it has had no contact with Waymo about I-280. A short protocol agreed with CHP, covering how a robotaxi recognises a traffic break and what releases it, would be cheaper than the next viral video.</p>
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    <item>
      <title>NHTSA&#39;s cyan robotaxi lamp is a promise, not a paint job</title>
      <link>https://www.liamding.com/en/posts/2026-11-02-cyan-ads-marker-lamp-is-a-promise/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0800</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.liamding.com/en/posts/2026-11-02-cyan-ads-marker-lamp-is-a-promise/</guid>
      <description>Reading NHTSA&amp;#39;s FMVSS No. 108 proposal as a product spec: the optional cyan ADS marker lamp is defined by who is expected to watch the road, which forces every automated driving product to say exactly when that expectation switches.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 id="the-problem">The problem</h2>
<p>On 23 October NHTSA announced a proposal to rewrite parts of FMVSS No. 108, the federal lighting standard, for automated vehicles. The Federal Register published it on 26 October, and comments are due on 25 November. Most of it removes requirements that assume a human driver, such as manual turn-signal levers and beam switches on cars that have no driving controls. The part that got the headlines is new: an optional cyan &ldquo;ADS marker lamp&rdquo; that tells police and other road users an automated driving system is driving.</p>
<p>The coverage focused on the colour. My conclusion up front: the colour is the least important decision in the document. What matters is how the lamp is defined. NHTSA does not define it as &ldquo;the ADS is switched on&rdquo;. It defines it as a lamp that indicates the vehicle &ldquo;is operating without the expectation that an occupant is monitoring the roadway&rdquo;, and it requires the lamp to switch off automatically once that expectation returns. That makes the lamp a public statement about who is responsible right now. Any company that fits one has to say, in engineering terms, the exact moment that responsibility moves.</p>
<h2 id="what-i-concluded">What I concluded</h2>
<p>First, the definition draws a visible line between supervised and unsupervised products. A driver-assistance system that requires the human to watch the road can never light this lamp, however capable it is, because the expectation that someone is monitoring never goes away. A driverless robotaxi lights it whenever it drives. NHTSA&rsquo;s text also says that, because the rule would explicitly permit these lamps under its activation criteria, it would prohibit fitting them to vehicles without ADS functionality. In practice, a cyan light on the street would mean &ldquo;no one inside is expected to be watching&rdquo;.</p>
<p>Second, the hard case is the conditional system in the middle. For a car that drives itself in a traffic jam and then asks the human to take over, the lamp has to go off at some point during that handover. The proposed text says only that the lamp &ldquo;must be automatically deactivated when a vehicle is operating with the expectation that an occupant is monitoring the roadway&rdquo;. It does not say whether that moment is when the takeover request starts, when the human confirms, or when the request times out. For a robotaxi the question doesn&rsquo;t arise. For a conditional system it is the whole product spec, and it is exactly what a police officer walking up to the car needs to know.</p>
<p>Third, NHTSA chose standardisation over a mandate, and said why. The agency writes that it &ldquo;lacks sufficient information to conclude that there is a safety need&rdquo; to require the lamp on every ADS vehicle, and that it cannot estimate the safety benefits. Its stated aim is narrower: if companies are going to add lights anyway, they should all look the same and not drown out the required lamps. That is a reasonable first step, but it means the lamp&rsquo;s value depends entirely on how many operators choose to fit it.</p>
<h2 id="constraints">Constraints</h2>
<p>The first constraint is the existing lights. NHTSA deliberately set the brightness lower than the SAE J3134 industry standard, because it tentatively concluded the SAE values would interfere with turn signals and other required lamps. A front lamp would need at least 4 cd with headlamps on and 20 cd with them off, with a 125 cd ceiling, which is the same maximum as a parking lamp. It must burn steadily, all lamps must switch on and off together, and it may not be optically combined with any other lamp, including daytime running lamps. There must be one or two lamps on each of the front, sides and rear, so four to eight in total, mounted at least 15 inches high.</p>
<p>The second constraint is that the lamp is not allowed to say anything else. Some designers would like a light that also signals intent, such as &ldquo;I&rsquo;m about to pull out&rdquo;. NHTSA proposes steady burning only, and says it is &ldquo;not aware of any research supporting this usage&rdquo;. It asks for research-based comments rather than allowing it now.</p>
<p>The third constraint is federal versus state law. NHTSA notes that at least one state, California, already permits these lamps under SAE J3134 (Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 25950 and 38750). It tentatively concludes that its rule would preempt the California provisions wherever its specification differs from J3134, for example on brightness, lamp combinations and manual switching. It also asks whether states should be barred from requiring the lamp. So a fleet that already runs to the California spec may have to change hardware.</p>
<p>The fourth constraint is evidence. The demand case rests on surveys, not crash data. An international survey of more than 4,400 drivers in the UK, Japan, the US and Germany found majorities in every country in favour, upwards of 80 percent in the US and the UK. Mercedes-Benz ran a two-year on-road validation in California from 2023 to 2025 with five vehicles. Meanwhile the UNECE working party on automated vehicles recommends uniform provisions for such a signal but does not recommend requiring it, citing uncertainty and the need for more research.</p>
<h2 id="the-options-and-what-i-traded-away">The options, and what I traded away</h2>
<p>My reconstruction of the choice set, not a description of anyone&rsquo;s internal reasoning.</p>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Option</th>
          <th>What it buys</th>
          <th>What it costs</th>
          <th>Why I would / would not pick it</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td>Mandate the lamp on every ADS vehicle</td>
          <td>One unambiguous signal on every driverless car</td>
          <td>A mandate NHTSA itself says it cannot yet justify with safety data</td>
          <td>Not yet</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Optional, standardised &ldquo;if equipped&rdquo; lamp (what was proposed)</td>
          <td>Consistent look, protects required lighting, legal certainty for those who fit it</td>
          <td>Coverage depends on each operator&rsquo;s choice</td>
          <td>I would pick it, with a tighter switch-off rule</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Leave it to SAE J3134 and the states</td>
          <td>No federal work; California already allows it</td>
          <td>A patchwork of colours and brightness across states</td>
          <td>I would not</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Allow flashing to signal intent</td>
          <td>A richer message to pedestrians</td>
          <td>No research supports it yet, and it mixes two meanings into one light</td>
          <td>Not until there is research</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Tie lamp state to a logged responsibility state</td>
          <td>The lamp becomes auditable after a crash</td>
          <td>Adds a data requirement to a lighting rule</td>
          <td>I would add it, through guidance if not the standard</td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="evidence">Evidence</h2>
<p>The strongest evidence is the regulatory text itself. The definition and the activation rows in the proposed tables both use the same wording about the &ldquo;expectation that an occupant is monitoring the roadway&rdquo;, and the rows say the lamp &ldquo;may be automatically activated&rdquo; in that state and &ldquo;must be automatically deactivated&rdquo; outside it. NHTSA also lists every place it departs from SAE J3134. One is notable: SAE says the occupant must not be able to switch the lamp on or off manually, and NHTSA omits that requirement and asks for comment. The industry reaction so far is supportive. The Verge quotes Waymo welcoming the effort to &ldquo;remove requirements that don&rsquo;t apply to vehicles designed without a human driver&rdquo;, and Nuro calling it &ldquo;a positive step&rdquo;. The Verge also reports that Mercedes-Benz, which won state approval for turquoise lights on its Level 3 Drive Pilot, has since moved to a Level 2++ system. If that is right, the company that did the most to push the lamp may not sell a car that can use it.</p>
<h2 id="where-this-stops-being-true">Where this stops being true</h2>
<p>Segment: for driverless robotaxis with no driving controls, the switch-off question is trivial and the lamp is mostly a branding and policing aid; my argument applies to conditional systems that hand control back to a person. Region: in the UNECE markets, where the working party does not recommend requiring the lamp, the US rule may become the reference design or may diverge from what Europe eventually adopts. Fleet size: with a few thousand driverless cars in a handful of cities, a voluntary lamp may matter little; if driverless cars become common on mixed roads, the pressure for a mandate will rise and the definition will carry more weight. Evidence: if research shows road users do not change behaviour when they see the lamp, the safety case for it weakens and it becomes a courtesy light. And if the final rule specifies the switch-off moment precisely, my main criticism goes away.</p>
<h2 id="what-i-would-do-differently">What I would do differently</h2>
<p>Define the switch-off moment in the rule, not in each company&rsquo;s design notes. The simplest version: the lamp goes off when the system issues a takeover request, not when the human finally responds. Road users should never see cyan on a car whose system has already asked a person to take over.</p>
<p>Keep SAE&rsquo;s ban on manual switching. A lamp an occupant can turn on or off is a lamp nobody outside the car can trust, and it defeats the point of defining it by responsibility.</p>
<p>Log the lamp state next to the automation state. If a crash report shows the system engaged but the lamp off, or the lamp on after a takeover request, that mismatch should be visible to investigators.</p>
<p>Hold the line on intent signalling until there is research. One light meaning one thing is the whole value of a standard colour.</p>
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