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    <title>Agent Security on Liam Ding</title>
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      <title>Five open-source agent projects, judged by where they stop</title>
      <link>https://www.liamding.com/en/posts/2026-11-05-open-source-agents-judged-by-where-they-stop/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 00:00:00 +0800</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.liamding.com/en/posts/2026-11-05-open-source-agents-judged-by-where-they-stop/</guid>
      <description>After a Railway employee&amp;#39;s test agent probed another company&amp;#39;s infrastructure, I picked five open-source agent projects by where each one puts its stop, not by stars.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 id="the-problem">The problem</h2>
<p>On 2 November (US Pacific time), Josh Manders posted on X asking Railway why one of its employees was &ldquo;trying to breach my infrastructure&rdquo;. His follow-up lists what the activity did: pulled credentials from inside an app container and asked for every secret on the platform, tried the cloud metadata endpoint, asked the cluster what the credentials were allowed to do, guessed internal database and cache names, and port-scanned all 65,536 internal addresses, twice. About 24 commands in 15 minutes, scripted. He says every attempt was blocked and nothing was accessed.</p>
<p>The employee, Jake Runzer, replied that there was no malice: he had been &ldquo;running some agents to do signups + agentic testing on similar platforms&rdquo;, had halted the harness, and agreed it was &ldquo;going off the rails and reaching too far&rdquo;. Railway&rsquo;s @JustJake called it &ldquo;agentically &lsquo;off the rails&rsquo;&rdquo; and said external testing that isn&rsquo;t manual would be banned.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All of the incident detail above is one party&rsquo;s account plus the other side&rsquo;s replies on X. Nobody has published logs. I use it as an example of a failure shape, not as a finding about anyone.</p></blockquote>
<p>What interests me is the shape. Most of those commands look like reads: list secrets, query metadata, scan ports. A gate that asks a person before &ldquo;spending money&rdquo; or &ldquo;sending a message&rdquo; would have let every one of them through. The stop that mattered was at the network and credential layer of the target, and it held.</p>
<p>So this week&rsquo;s open-source picks are agent projects that each put a stop somewhere specific. I opened all five on 4 November 2026, around 3 PM Pacific.</p>
<h2 id="what-i-concluded">What I concluded</h2>
<p>Pick an agent tool by where it stops, then match that to the way your agent is likely to fail. Stars measure attention: the most-starred repo here is a one-commit research prototype, and the only one that controls the network sits at 493.</p>
<p>Four questions cover most of it:</p>
<ol>
<li>What can the agent reach (files, network, credentials)?</li>
<li>What counts as an instruction, as opposed to material it reads?</li>
<li>Who is allowed to hand it work?</li>
<li>Which actions wait for a person, and what happens when nobody is there?</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="constraints">Constraints</h2>
<p>Anyone comparing these should know:</p>
<ul>
<li>Star counts and commit dates move daily. Numbers below are a snapshot from the GitHub API on 4 November 2026; commit dates are UTC.</li>
<li>Four of the five repos were created in the last five weeks. Open Duet&rsquo;s repository dates from 2023, but its README describes the current coworker product.</li>
<li>I read READMEs and docs. I did not install or run any of these, so every claim about behaviour is the project&rsquo;s own claim.</li>
<li>These solve different problems. The comparison is about where the stop sits, not which tool is &ldquo;best&rdquo;.</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="the-options-and-what-i-traded-away">The options, and what I traded away</h2>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Repo</th>
          <th>License</th>
          <th>Stars (4 Nov)</th>
          <th>Latest commit on main</th>
          <th>Where it stops</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td><a href="https://github.com/strands-agents/box">strands-agents/box</a></td>
          <td>Apache-2.0</td>
          <td>493</td>
          <td>4 Nov 2026</td>
          <td>What the agent can reach: OS isolation, network egress, credentials</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td><a href="https://github.com/KKKKhazix/agent-autoloop">KKKKhazix/agent-autoloop</a></td>
          <td>MIT</td>
          <td>2,424</td>
          <td>4 Nov 2026</td>
          <td>What counts as an instruction, and side effects that need a card</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td><a href="https://github.com/deepseek-ai/dsh-superagent-prototype">deepseek-ai/dsh-superagent-prototype</a></td>
          <td>MIT</td>
          <td>18,524</td>
          <td>31 Oct 2026</td>
          <td>Who may give it work, and observe before auto</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td><a href="https://github.com/Anil-matcha/open-duet">Anil-matcha/open-duet</a></td>
          <td>Apache-2.0</td>
          <td>6,771</td>
          <td>4 Nov 2026</td>
          <td>Which actions need approval, per coworker</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td><a href="https://github.com/wangzan101/Mika">wangzan101/Mika</a></td>
          <td>Apache-2.0</td>
          <td>6,604</td>
          <td>4 Nov 2026</td>
          <td>Money only, by default</td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<p><strong>Strands Box: stop at the boundary.</strong> A sandbox engine in Rust. Its README says operations the engine checks are denied by default, an egress gateway checks connections and HTTP method and path, an MCP broker checks tool calls, and credentials are injected so the agent never receives the underlying secrets. Policies can look at history: an earlier file read can deny a later outbound request. Decisions are recorded as OTLP JSON. This is the layer that maps most directly to the Railway list: a harness that cannot see secrets or reach a metadata endpoint has nothing to &ldquo;reach too far&rdquo; with. The cost: it&rsquo;s a preview that runs locally on macOS with Apple silicon, and writing the policies is your job.</p>
<p><strong>agent-autoloop: stop at what counts as an instruction.</strong> A background runner for command-line coding agents, with a kernel of about 1,650 lines and no runtime dependencies. Before deleting data, restarting services, spending money or sending messages outside, it asks through a card and waits without holding a process. Text written by other people, such as an issue title, goes into a file marked as material rather than into the prompt, and events that try to set the working directory, the agent or its access level are rejected. Work handed back and forth between agents stops after 8 hops. Its SECURITY.md is unusually candid: this does not stop all prompt injection, and an agent with &ldquo;read&rdquo; access can still read keys on the machine unless you isolate it with a separate system account or a container. Not on Windows yet, and the webhook templates are only tested against local mocks.</p>
<p><strong>DeepSeek&rsquo;s dsh-superagent prototype: stop at who may ask.</strong> The README says it is a research prototype for reference only, not an official DeepSeek product, and the repo has one commit. Its authorization doc is the interesting part: every source of work gets an admission rule, a request is explicit, inferred or not admitted, and bots cannot make explicit requests or stop a ticket. The default mode is <code>observe</code>, which records what it would have accepted and accepts nothing; the doc recommends switching to <code>auto</code> only after reviewing those recorded decisions. The cost: it is a design to learn from, not something to deploy.</p>
<p><strong>Open Duet: stop at the action, chosen per coworker.</strong> A self-hosted workspace for named AI coworkers, with four approval modes: Ask first, Accept edits, Approve for me and Plan only. A routine never approves an action by itself, and changes in connected apps wait for approval. Its own caveats: connected apps were tested against a fake Composio service, not the real one; the self-hosted server is experimental and single-owner; desktop installers are unsigned.</p>
<p><strong>Mika: stop only before money.</strong> An Android agent that runs apps on a hidden background screen, with no Mika server, and hands logins, verification codes and payments to you. Its modes doc is explicit that in the default Ask mode, only the step that spends money is confirmed: &ldquo;Sending messages, posting, submitting forms, deleting and changing settings are not asked about; they are just done.&rdquo; When nobody is there, a scheduled task skips the paying step and tells you. That is a clear, honest line, and a narrow one. If your worry is an agent messaging the wrong person, the default doesn&rsquo;t cover it.</p>
<h2 id="evidence">Evidence</h2>
<p>Map the Railway list onto these projects and the gaps show up:</p>
<ul>
<li>Pulling credentials and requesting every secret is what Box&rsquo;s credential injection and autoloop&rsquo;s &ldquo;use a separate account or container&rdquo; advice are about. An approval card would not catch it, because nothing looks like a side effect.</li>
<li>The metadata endpoint and the port scan are network reads. Box&rsquo;s egress gateway is the only stop here that inspects them.</li>
<li>&ldquo;Signups and agentic testing on similar platforms&rdquo; is a scope question. dsh&rsquo;s admission table, and observe before auto, are a way to see what an agent would take on before it does.</li>
<li>Open Duet and Mika gate on the type of action. That works for money and outgoing messages, and does nothing for reconnaissance.</li>
</ul>
<p>Star counts in the table don&rsquo;t line up with any of this. The 18,524-star repo describes itself as a prototype; the 493-star one is the only project here that stops outbound network calls.</p>
<p>Counter-arguments worth taking seriously. &ldquo;The target&rsquo;s defences held, so this proves the system works&rdquo;: for the target, yes. The agent&rsquo;s owner still found out from a public post. &ldquo;Approval gates are what users actually want&rdquo;: for consumer agents, probably, and Mika&rsquo;s money-only default is a defensible product choice. It is just a different stop. &ldquo;You can stack all four&rdquo;: you can, and for an agent with credentials you should. The point is to know which layer you are relying on.</p>
<h2 id="where-this-stops-being-true">Where this stops being true</h2>
<p>For an agent that only edits files in a throwaway checkout, an approval gate is enough, and a network sandbox is overhead. For a phone agent doing your shopping, money is the right first stop. The argument is aimed at agents left running with credentials and network access, where the worst case is something reading or scanning, not something buying.</p>
<h2 id="what-i-would-do-differently">What I would do differently</h2>
<p>If I were setting up a background agent this month:</p>
<p>Start from reach. Give it its own account or container, inject credentials instead of exposing them, and deny outbound traffic by default.</p>
<p>Keep other people&rsquo;s text out of the instruction path, as autoloop does, and cap how far work can be handed on.</p>
<p>Run new sources of work in observe mode first and read what it would have accepted.</p>
<p>Then add approval cards for side effects, and write down which actions are not gated, the way Mika&rsquo;s doc does.</p>
<p>Choose by stars last.</p>
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